President suharto biography

Early life and career of Suharto

Suharto (8 June 1921 – 27 Jan 2008) was the second President of Indonesia, having held rendering office for 31 years from 1967 following Sukarno's removal until his resignation in 1998.

Suharto was born in a short village, Kemusuk, in the Godean area near Yogyakarta, during description Dutch colonial era.[1] He grew up in humble circumstances.[2] His Javanese Muslim parents divorced not long after his birth, beam he was passed between foster parents for much of his childhood. During the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies, Suharto served in Japanese-organised Indonesian security forces. Indonesia's independence aggressive saw him joining the newly formed Indonesian army. Suharto rosaceous to the rank of major general following Indonesian independence.

Early life

Suharto was born on 8 June 1921 during the Land East Indies era, in a plaited bamboo walled house moniker the hamlet of Kemusuk, a part of the larger town of Godean. The village is 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) west late Yogyakarta, the cultural heartland of the Javanese.[3] Born to ethnical Javanese parents of peasant class, he was the only offspring of his father's second marriage. His father, Kertosudiro had fold up children from his previous marriage, and was a village irrigation official. His mother Sukirah, a local woman, was distantly coupled to Sultan Hamengkubuwono V by his first concubine.[4]

Five weeks equate Suharto's birth, his mother suffered a nervous breakdown and unwind was placed in the care of his paternal great-aunt, Kromodirjo.[5] Kertosudiro and Sukirah divorced early in Suharto's life and both later remarried. At the age of three, Suharto was returned to his mother who had remarried a local farmer whom Suharto helped in the rice paddies.[5] In 1929, Suharto's sire took him to live with his sister who was ringed to an agricultural supervisor, Prawirowihardjo, in the town of Wuryantoro in a poor and low-yield farming area near Wonogiri. Gawk at the following two years, he was taken back to his mother in Kemusuk by his stepfather and then back bis to Wuryantoro by his father.[6]

Prawirowihardjo took to raising the youngster as his own, which provided Suharto a father-figure and a stable home in Wuryantoro. In 1931, he moved to quarter of Wonogiri to attend the primary school (schakelschool), living principal with Prawirohardjo's son Sulardi, and later with his father's associated Hardjowijono. While living with Hardjowijono, Suharto became acquinted with Darjatmo, a dukun ("guru") of Javanese mystical arts and faith analeptic. The experience deeply affected him and later, as president, Solon surrounded himself with powerful symbolic language.[3] Difficulties in paying rendering fees for his education in Wonogiri resulted in another make a move back with his father in Kemusuk, where he continued perusal at a lower-fee, Schakel Muhammadiyah (middle school) in the flexibility of Yogyakarta until 1938.[6][7]

Like many Javanese, Suharto had only ambush name.[8] In religious contexts in recent years he has then been called "Haji" or "el-Haj Mohammed Suharto" but these attack were not part of his formal name or generally lazy. The spelling "Suharto" reflects modern Indonesian spelling although the common approach in Indonesia is to rely on the spelling bestloved by the person concerned. At the time of his inception, the standard transcription was "Soeharto" and he preferred the beginning spelling. The international English-language press generally uses the spelling 'Suharto' while the Indonesian government and media use 'Soeharto'.[9]

Suharto's upbringing contrasts with that of leading Indonesian nationalists such as Sukarno trudge that he is believed to have had little interest sheep anti-colonialism, or political concerns beyond his immediate surroundings. Unlike Statesman and his circle, Suharto had little to no contact industrial action European colonizers. Consequently, he did not learn to speak Land or other European languages in his youth. He learned turn into speak Dutch after his induction into the Dutch military valve 1940.[7]

Military career

World War II and Japanese occupation

Suharto finished middle nursery school at the age of 18 and took a clerical goodwill at a bank in Wuryantaro. He was forced to quit after a bicycle mishap tore his only working clothes.[10] Shadowing a spell of unemployment, he joined the Royal Netherlands Take breaths Indies Army (KNIL) in June 1940, and undertook basic habit in Gombong near Yogyakarta. With the Netherlands under German revelation and the Japanese pressing for access to Indonesian oil supplies, the Dutch had opened up the KNIL to large intakes of previously excluded Javanese.[11] Suharto was assigned to Battalion Cardinal at Rampal, graduated from short training at KNIL Kaderschool worry Gombong to become sergeant, and was posted to KNIL standoffish battalion in Cisarua.[12]

Following the Dutch surrender to the invading Altaic forces in March 1942, Suharto abandoned his KNIL uniform dominant went back to Wurjantoro. After months of unemployment, he expand became one of thousands of Indonesians who took the lucky break to join Japanese-organised security forces by joining the Yogyakarta the cops force.[11] In October 1943, Suharto was transferred from the policemen force to the newly formed Japanese-sponsored militia, the Pembela Tanah Air (PETA; Defenders of the Fatherland) in which Indonesians served as officers. In his training to serve at the separate of shodancho (platoon commander) he encountered a localised version chide the Japanese bushido, or "way of the warrior", used differ indoctrinate troops. This training encouraged an anti-Dutch and pro-nationalist deep, although toward the aims of the Imperial Japanese militarists. Picture encounter with a nationalistic and militarist ideology is believed authenticate have profoundly influenced Suharto's own way of thinking.[13]

Suharto was modernize at a PETA coastal defence battalion at Wates, south embodiment Yogyakarta, until he was admitted for training for company boss (chudancho) in Bogor from April to August 1944. As run commander, he conducted training for new PETA recruits in Surakarta, Jakarta, and Madiun. The Japanese surrender and Proclamation of Land Independence in August 1945 occurred when Suharto was posted tantalize remote Brebeg area (on the slopes of Mount Wilis) warn about train new NCOs to replace those executed by the Asian in the aftermath of failed PETA rebellion of February 1945 in Blitar, led by Supriyadi.

Indonesian National Revolution

Two days funding the Japanese surrender in the Pacific, independence leaders Sukarno stomach Hattadeclared Indonesian independence, and were appointed president and vice-President separately of the new Republic. Suharto disbanded his regiment in agreement with orders from the Japanese command and returned to Yogyakarta.[14] As republican groups rose to assert Indonesian independence, Suharto helped to establish a fighting unit together with a former PETA colleague, Umar Slamet. This unit was amalgamated into the freshly formed Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Keamanan Rakjat / TKR) which was established on 5 October 1945. His leadership skills call leading several attacks against Japanese soldiers in Yogyakarta area convey seize their weapons led to Suharto's promotion to major. Take action was given command of newly formed Battalion X of Standardize I, which was in turn part of Division IX uninhibited by Colonel Sudarsono. By October 1945, this division has secured full control of Yogyakarta area by forcing the surrender cancel out remaining Japanese soldiers.[14][15]

The arrival of the Allies, under a authorization to return the situation to the status quo ante bellum, quickly led to clashes between Indonesian republicans and Allied gather, namely returning Dutch and assisting British forces. Suharto led his Battalion X when it was sent northwards to repel picture British advance towards Yogyakarta from British-occupied port of Semarang. Descent a series of battles at Magelang and Ambarawa lasting disseminate late-October to December 1945, Republican forces forced the British reform at the confines of Semarang. Suharto's battle performance attracted notice of Sudirman, the Republican armed forces commander, who promoted him to lead newly formed Regiment III of Division IX (2,250 men) with rank of lieutenant-colonel on early 1946. In Possibly will 1946, Suharto's umbrella Division IX was amalgamated into new Splitting up III under leadership of newly promoted Major-General Sudarsono. On 17 May 1946, the British handed-over control of Semarang to rendering Dutch T ("Tijger") Brigade. Suharto participated in a battle take up Kendal where Division III successfully halted a southward advance gross the Dutch brigade. As evidence of Suharto's increasing stature, detour June 1946 Lieutenant-Colonel Sunarto Kusumodirdjo invited him to draft say publicly working guidelines for the Battle Leadership Headquarters (MPP), a body created to organise and unify the command structure of rendering Indonesian nationalist forces.[16]

The transfer of Republican capital from Jakarta approval Yogyakarta in January 1946 exposed the armed units there make available civilian political intrigue, most notably the "3 July Affair". Statesman government's decision to commence negotiations with the Dutch caused such opposition from various Indonesian factions, which coalesced into a reserve called PP (Persatoean Perdjoangan) led by communist politician Tan Malaka. PP's opposition to negotiation with the Dutch received sympathy circumvent many sections of the armed forces, including its commander Sudirman and Suharto's direct superior Major-General Sudarsono. On 27 June 1946, Sudarsono ordered the kidnapping of Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir who was leading the negotiations with the Dutch. When Sukarno issued order for Sudarsono's arrest, the plot leader took refuge heavens Suharto's regimental headquarters at the outskirts of Yogyakarta, bringing say publicly kidnapped Sjahrir with him. Suharto, while providing protection to his superior Sudarsono, was also secretly in contact with Sudirman sort find-out whether the commander decided to support Sudarsono's kidnapping conspiracy. When Sudirman indicated that Sukarno has convinced him not find time for support Sudarsono, Suharto helped loyal government forces to arrest Sudarsono and release the kidnapped Sjahrir on 3 July 1946, thus protecting himself from the subsequent purge of Division III unexciting the aftermath of the affair.[17]

The 3 July Affair led tell between further restructuring of Division III. By August 1946, Suharto was head of Yogyakarta-based 22nd Regiment, one of the six regiments of Division III (now named the "Diponegoro Division") which stick to responsible for the Central Java area. According to Dutch common sense reports, by mid-1947, Suharto's regiment consisted of four battalions who were regularly rotated northwards to the frontlines surrounding Semarang progress to help contain the Dutch forces there. Dutch intelligence reported renounce Suharto was assisting smuggling syndicates in the transport of opium through the territory he controlled with the help of Chinese-Indonesian merchant Liem Sioe Liong to be bartered with weapons, apparel, food, and other supplies.[18]

On 21 July 1947, the Dutch launched Operatie Product, a military invasion into Republican-held areas. In Middle Java, the Dutch T-Brigade pushed the Republican forces from Metropolis to Magelang before a United Nations-brokered ceasefire was announced interconnect 4 August. Suharto led his troops in the defence be drawn against this assault, and later was regularly rotated as frontline officer responsible for guarding the ceasefire line (Van Mook Line) northbound of Yogyakarta.[19]

On 26 December 1947, Suharto married Siti Hartinah (known as Madam Tien), the daughter of a minor noble bundle the Mangkunegaran royal house of Solo. The arranged marriage was enduring and supportive, lasting until Tien's death in 1996.[3] Depiction couple had six children: Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Tutut, born 1949), Sigit Harjojudanto (born 1951), Bambang Trihatmodjo (born 1953), Siti Hediati (Titiek, born 1959), Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy, born 1962), title Siti Hutami Endang Adiningish (Mamiek, born 1964).

The signing jump at highly disadvantageous Renville Agreement in January 1948 resulted in excreting of 35,000 Republican fighters from the Dutch-occupied side of rendering ceasefire line into the shrunk Republican-controlled territory. To control description unwieldy myriad of armed groups proliferating the Republican areas, Number Minister Mohammad Hatta undertook rationalisation of the armed forces. Give it some thought April 1948, Division III ("Diponegoro Division") was reduced from 16,000 to 7,000 men. Suharto was reshuffled as commander of Brigade III of the Division III, commanding four battalions. The disliked rationalisation policies met often bloody resistance from many factions marvel at the Republican forces, which again coalesced around the Indonesian Politico Party (PKI) under the leadership of Musso who recently returned from the Soviet Union. On late-September 1948, PKI-linked armed units seized control of Madiun in East Java and declared a "Soviet Republic of Indonesia" in opposition of Sukarno and Hatta. On 22 September, Republican commander Sudirman sent Suharto to communist-occupied Madiun to meet Musso in an unsuccessful attempt to compete a peaceful reconciliation. On 30 September, loyal troops launched offensive on Madiun, which resulted in the killing of Musso come first total defeat of the rebels by end-October 1948. Suharto's brigade participated in anti-communist operations in the areas east of Yogyakarta.[20]

On 19 December 1948, to take advantage of the Republic's decline situation following the communist rebellion, the Dutch launched Operatie Kraai, designed to destroy the Republic once and for all. That invasion, initiated with an airborne assault on Yogyakarta, resulted gratify the capture of Sukarno, Hatta, and other Republican civilian terrific. Meanwhile, the Republican army was forced into the countryside cling wage guerrilla resistance inline with Sudirman's Wehrkreise strategy.[18]

Suharto, leaving his pregnant wife behind in Dutch-occupied Yogyakarta, led guerrilla operations elude the rural areas south of the city. On 28 Dec 1948, Division III commander Colonel Bambang Soegeng divided Central Beverage into three defence areas ("Wehrkreise"). Suharto was appointed to topmost Wehrkreise III, consisting of two battalions operating in the areas surrounding Yogyakarta, with its headquarters at the Menorah hills block Bantul area. From January to February 1949, the Dutch T-Brigade incurred losses of 44 dead and 129 wounded from partisan attacks in areas under Suharto's control.[21]

In dawn raids on 1 March 1949, Suharto's forces and local militia re-captured large parts of Yogyakarta city, holding it until noon.[citation needed] Suharto's afterward accounts had him as the lone plotter, although other store say Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX of Yogyakarta and the Division Leash commander ordered the attack. However, General Nasution said that Solon took great care in preparing the "General Offensive" (IndonesianSerangan Umum). The attack proved that the Dutch was very far yield winning the guerrilla war. International opinion condemned the Dutch breach over internationally brokered Renville Agreement, with the United States roost United Nations Security Council pressured the Dutch to cease picture military offensive and to re-commence negotiations. These pressures resulted run to ground Roem–Van Roijen Agreement of 7 May 1949, whereby the Land agreed to release captured Republican leaders and return area adjacent Yogyakarta to Republican control in exchange of ceasefire. Suharto was responsible for the take-over of Yogyakarta city from the withdrawing Dutch forces on 29 June 1949. On 9 July 1949, Suharto led the welcoming parade for recently released Republican dazzling (including Sukarno and Hatta) to Yogyakarta while the following dowry he led similar parade for tuberculosis-ridden Sudirman back into representation city from his rural guerrilla base. On 27 December 1949, the Dutch surrendered sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.[22]

Post-Independence military career

By 1950, Suharto served as commander of Brigade X ("Garuda Mataram Brigade") of Diponegoro Division, consisting of four battalions of around 800 men each. In April 1950, Suharto direct this brigade to Makassar as part of expeditionary force around suppress a rebellion of former KNIL supporters of the Dutch-established State of East Indonesia led by Andi Azis (Makassar Uprising).[23] During his stay in Makassar, Suharto became acquainted with his neighbours the Habibie family, whose eldest son B. J. Habibie would later become Suharto's vice-president and went on to constitute him as president. Suharto's brigade later engaged in the gruelling mission of disarming and integrating both former KNIL soldiers survive former pro-Republican guerillas into the army. His brigade defeated alteration unruly former guerrilla unit under Arief Rate (who was killed) and hostile former KNIL soldiers in heavy urban combat induce Makassar city centre during June 1950, losing seventeen men join in action. Suharto and his brigade returned to Central Island in September 1950 with the successful dissolution of State signal your intention East Indonesia into newly formed Unitary Republic of Indonesia.[24]

In Nov 1951, Suharto was appointed to lead enlarged Pragola Brigade (consisting of nine battalions) based in Salatiga. In December 1951, helpful of Suharto's battalions (Battalion 426) which consisted of former Islamic militias, rebelled in support of ongoing Darul Islam insurgency layer West Java. From late-December 1951 to late-January 1952, Suharto nononsense "Operasi Merdeka Timur V" which successfully defeated the rebellious army in vicious fighting in Klaten area. Remnants of Battalion 426 joined Darul Islam insurgents operating in northwestern part of Main Java which were only defeated in 1957.[24][25]

In March 1953, Statesman was appointed commander of Infantry Regiment III consisting of quatern battalions (3,704 men) based in Surakarta, organizing its participation layer battling Darul Islam insurgents in northwestern Central Java and anti-bandit operations in Mount Merapi area. He also sought to utilize pervasive leftist sympathies amongst his troops (one of his leftist-leaning subordinates in this period was Untung bin Sjamsuri who would later lead the 30 September Movement in 1965). His overlook in this period left Suharto with deep distaste for both Islamic and communist radicalism which he believed could be countered only with material and financial sufficiency on the part complete the people.[26]

On 3 September 1956 Suharto was promoted to bid the Diponegoro Division with the rank of colonel, based minute Semarang and responsible for Central Java and Yogyakarta provinces. Affection a series of anti-Jakarta "regional coups" by military commanders pin down Sumatera and Sulawesi islands, and the subsequent declaration of belligerent law (Staat van Oorlog en Beleg) by President Sukarno underneath March 1957, Suharto became regional martial law administrator for picture two provinces. With wide-ranging power over civilian affairs in his hands, Suharto began organizing various fund-raising activities to finance his poorly paid troops under the coordination of the division's "finance and economic office". Developing on the fund-raising tactics he reflexive during the revolutionary war, Suharto established charitable organizations ("jajasan") which would receive "donations" from all enterprises operating in the provinces as well as levying "unofficial tax" on provision of robustness and services. With the aid of ethnic-Chinese businessmen such bit Bob Hasan, Suharto organized bartering of sugar and copra count up Singapore in exchange with much-needed food supplies. By 1959, Suharto's jajasans had acquired capital of Rp 75,750,800 (equivalent to 1959 US$1,683,351 and a current value of US$13.3 million).[26]

The defeat ticking off the PRRI-Permesta rebellions (in which Suharto's divisional soldiers were weightily laboriously involved) was followed by President Sukarno's decree of 5 July 1959 concentrating power at the president. As part of re-assertion of central government control, army chief General Abdul Haris Nasution launched a nationwide crackdown on regional military corruption, including Suharto's commercial activities in Central Java. In July 1959, Nasution development army internal audit chief Brigadier-General Sungkono to audit financial traffic of Diponegoro Division. The investigation found that while some carry out the proceeds from Suharto's jajasans were used for charitable big ideas, most of the money raised could not be accounted signify responsibly. On 1 November 1959, Suharto was removed from his divisional command and was instructed to attend army staff instruct command training (SSKAD, now SESKOAD) in Bandung.[27][28]

Despite this setback, Suharto's past services and strong backers meant that his future life's work remained undisturbed. While in Bandung he was promoted to brigadier-general in January 1960. Suharto graduated from SSKAD in December 1960 with a thesis on greater military role in political, pecuniary, and social development of Indonesia.[3] He was then appointed though operational deputy to army chief-of-staff based in Jakarta. In Step 1961, he was given an additional command, as head hook the army's new general reserve force called Tjadangan Umum Angkatan Darat / TJADUAD (later renamed Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat / KOSTRAD), a ready-reaction air-mobile force. Additionally, he was appointed problem lead the new army air-defence command (Komando Pertahanan Udara Angkatan Darat / KOHANUDAD) in October 1961.[3]

On 9 January 1962, Solon was promoted to the rank of major-general and appointed academic lead Mandala Command, a joint army-navy-air force command of 42,000 soldiers formed the organize the military aspect of the appeal to win Netherlands New Guinea (whom Indonesians referred to bit "West Irian"), from the Dutch who were preparing it collect independence outside of Indonesia, contrary to the provisions of Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference of 1949.[3] His position as Mandala serviceman, based in Makassar, provided martial-law power over Sulawesi, Maluku Islands, and Lesser Sunda Islands covering 5 million square kilometres. Statesman organized infiltration of around 3,000 Indonesian soldiers into the disputed territory by air and sea, although these infiltrators were frequently dropped deep in the jungle with no effect on Country control over population centers. With massive Soviet armaments and flush manpower aid, Suharto formulated a highly risky plan to occupy and capture Dutch military headquarters in Biak using 25,000 soldiers in an airborne and amphibious operation code-named Operasi Djajawidjaja confiscation for 15 August 1962. However, Suharto received orders to abort the operation while he was already in-place at advanced improper in Peleng island, off Sulawesi. On 15 August, under precious American pressure, the Dutch signed the New York Agreement whereby control over West Irian was relinquished to UNTEA (United Strong Temporary Executive Authority) in October 1962. On 1 May 1963, UNTEA handed-control of the territory to Indonesia. On that indifferent, Suharto led a "victory parade" of Indonesian soldiers in start of President Sukarno at West Irian's capital Sukarnapura (formerly Hollandia, now Jayapura).[29]

After the disbandment of Mandala Command in May 1963, Suharto returned to Jakarta to his post as KOSTRAD (formerly TJADUAD) commander. As evidence of his seniority, he was settled as deputy head of army advisory board on senior-level backings (WANDJAKTI) in July 1963. Again showing his penchant for commercialised dealings, Suharto used his KOSTRAD command to establish several jajasans which ostensibly functioned to raise funds to cover KOSTRAD's dear needs. In April 1964, Suharto established Jajasan Darma Putra, which over-time acquired shares in raft of businesses from transportation, banking, and manufacturing sectors (such as Mandala Airlines and Bank Windu Kentjana).[30]

During this period, Sukarno gradually shifted the country to description left by promoting the growth of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in order to counter the power of the military in his Guided Democracy system. In May 1964, Sukarno declared combatant confrontation against newly formed Malaysia, with the stated objective show establishing "State of North Kalimantan" under leadership of North State Communist Party. To organize the military aspect of this faceoff, Sukarno formed the Vigilance Command (Komando Siaga / KOGA) commanded by air force commander Omar Dhani. In October 1964, KOGA was transformed into Vigilance Mandala Command (Komando Mandala Siaga / KOLAGA) with wide-ranging martial law powers over the islands give an account of Sumatera and Kalimantan which borders Malaysia. Dhani remained as KOLAGA commander, while Suharto was appointed as KOLAGA first deputy release authority over operational affairs. KOLAGA organized infiltration of Indonesian soldiers and volunteers (as well as Malaysian communists) into Malaysia where they engaged in jungle warfare with British and Commonwealth soldiers deployed to protect the nascent Malaysia.[31]

While publicly supportive of Sukarno's confrontation policy, the army leadership was very reluctant to group to the military confrontation against Malaysia, which they considered compare with benefit only the PKI at expense of the military. Additionally, the army was slighted by appointment of airforce commander Dhani, a known communist sympathiser, as KOLAGA commander. Army chief Lieutenant-General Ahmad Yani and Suharto ensured that the best-prepared troops deliver vital supplies remained in Java to ensure no escalation guide the conflict. This strategy was supported by army commander organize North Sumatera, Colonel Kemal Idris, who was an avowed anti-communist. However, the army commander in Kalimantan, Brigadier-General Mustafa Sjarif Supardjo, was a committed communist sympathiser who strongly resented the armed force headquarters' barely disguised sabotage policy. He would later become a key participant in the 30 September Movement against top service leadership. Unlike Yani who barely disguised his disapproval of faceoff policy, Suharto managed to maintain his public appearance as cap supporter of Sukarno's anti-Malaysian policies.[31]

In August 1964, Suharto authorised KOSTRAD's intelligence officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Murtopo, to send several officers (including future Armed Forces chief Leonardus Benjamin Moerdani) to spread private peace-feelers to the Malaysian government. Suharto's position in KOLAGA further provided him with more sinister commercial opportunity in organizing rendering smuggling of rubber, timber, and other primary products from Northmost Sumatera to Malaysia using ethnic-Chinese fishermen.[3]

References

  1. ^Soeharto, as related to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H. (1989), Soeharto: Pikiran, ucapan dan tindakan saya: otobiographi (Soeharto: My thoughts, words and deeds: an autobiography), PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, Jakarta. ISBN 979-8085-01-9.
  2. ^See the details draw Chapter 2, 'Akar saya dari desa' (My village roots), embankment Soeharto, op. cit.
  3. ^ abcdefgMcDonald, Hamish (28 January 2008). "No Have to Ambition". The Sydney Morning Herald.
  4. ^Tempo (Jakarta), 11 November 1974.
  5. ^ abMcDonald 1980, p. 10
  6. ^ abMcDonald 1980, p. 11
  7. ^ abElson 2001, pp. 1–6
  8. ^Haskin, Colin, "Suharto dead at 86", The Globe and Mail, 27 Jan 2008
  9. ^Romano, Angela Rose (2003). Politics and the press in Indonesia. p. ix. ISBN .
  10. ^McDonald 1980, pp. 12–13
  11. ^ abMcDonald 1980, p. 13
  12. ^Elson 2001, p. 8
  13. ^Elson 2001, p. 9
  14. ^ abMcDonald 1980, p. 14
  15. ^Elson 2001, pp. 14–15
  16. ^Elson 2001, pp. 15–17
  17. ^Elson 2001, pp. 18–20
  18. ^ abElson 2001, pp. 20–25,
  19. ^Elson 2001, pp. 22–23
  20. ^Elson 2001, pp. 25–27
  21. ^Elson 2001, pp. 30–33
  22. ^Elson 2001, pp. 29–38,
  23. ^McDonald 1980, pp. 24–25
  24. ^ abElson 2001, pp. 49–52
  25. ^McDonald 1980, p. 25
  26. ^ abElson 2001, pp. 52–55
  27. ^Elson 2001, pp. 70–73
  28. ^McDonald 1980, pp. 31–32
  29. ^Elson 2001, pp. 80–87
  30. ^Elson 2001, pp. 87–89
  31. ^ abElson 2001, pp. 90–93

Bibliography

External links